ITALIA Medida polémica
Los inmigrantes tendrán que examinarse de italiano para obtener la residencia
El examen consiste en la comprensión de textos y frases de uso común; tienen que responder al 80% correctamente.
SOMOS OU NÃO A CASA PIA DO MUNDO?E DEPOIS DE MUITO "INVESTIMENTO" E DO "PASSAPORTE" AÍ VÃO ELES TRATAR DA SUA VIDINHA POR OUTRAS PARAGENS MAIS VANTAJOSAS.OS INDÍGENAS ESSES CADA VEZ ESTÃO MAIS RICOS... PORQUE NESTA ÁREA DE INTERESSE O SEGREDO É A ALMA DO NEGÓCIO...
PERTENCE CERTAMENTE AO submundo da blogosfera DE ACORDO COM CIENTÍFICAS CLASSIFICAÇÕES DUNS GAJOS QUE VIVEM DOS MEUS IMPOSTOS E ANDAM A AFUNDAR PORTUGAL
Thursday, December 9, 2010
OS SOCIALISTAS TÊM DOIS AMORES.OS AMERICANOS E OS CHINESES.PARECE QUE ASSIM NÃO VAI DAR...
WikiLeaks : la Chine en Afrique, une menace pour les intérêts américains
pour Le Monde.fr | 08.12.10 | 22h30
Le président chinois, Hu Jintao, à Nairobi le 28 avril 2006.AFP/SIMON MAINA
En Afrique, les Etats-Unis regardent de près les faits et gestes de le Chine. Au cours des cinq dernières années, Washington a pris conscience que l'envergure de la politique africaine du gouvernement chinois, destinée notamment à garantir l'accès aux ressources du continent noir, est devenue une menace pour ses propres intérêts. Rien d'étonnant que les diplomates suivent avec attention certains dossiers liés à la présence chinoise en Afrique, et tentent de voir plus clair dans la politique de Pékin, même lorsqu'il s'agit d'une affaire de corruption.
Le Kenya en fournit un exemple. Dans un document obtenu par WikiLeaks et analysé par Le Monde, l'ambassade amércaine à Nairobi décortique un cas de pot-de-vin versé dans le cadre d'une attribution de marché de la compagnie de téléphone Telkom Kenya à une entreprise chinoise, Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Company (ZTE) – dont les produits envahissent l'Afrique – dans le cadre d'un marché d'équipement des services de renseignement, le NSIS.
Pour les diplomates, l'attribution du marché repose sur un "pot-de-vin ", qui a "conduit Telkom à attribuer ce marché [à ZTE] après y avoir été contrainte" par le directeur général du NSIS, Michael Gichangi, et le directeur de la division des opérations, Joseph Kamau. "La préférence de Gichangi pour ZTE est basée sur une commission reçue au cours d'un voyage en Chine. Kamau a reçu des paiements mensuels de 5 000 dollars de ZTE, utilisés pour payer des factures médicales."
"DES CONTREBANDIERS D'IVOIRES CHINOIS"
Ce cas de corruption somme toute modeste est-il fondé sur une enquête serrée ? Le télégramme ne le dit pas, son auteur préférant passer à d'autres aspects de la présence chinoise, notamment le fait que le pays est "submergé" par de la "contrefaçon chinoise" qui concurrence des produits américains, telles que "les batteries", tandis que des masses de travailleurs chinois arrivent au Kenya et menacent l'emploi dans le pays.
A Nairobi, "90% des contrebandiers d'ivoire sont chinois", selon l'organisme kenyan chargé des parcs et de la faune sauvage, le KWSAFP/DOUANES FRANCAISES
Le même télégramme fait état d'une conversation avec un responsable de l'organisme kenyan chargé des parcs et de la faune sauvage, le KWS. Celui-ci dit avoir noté "une hausse sensible des activités de braconnage à proximité des camps où sont installés les travailleurs chinois". Il cite un rapport du KWS qui avance que "90% des contrebandiers d'ivoires détenus à l'aéroport [de Nairobi] sont des Chinois."
Au Nigeria, les ambitions de la Chine intéressent et inquiètent beaucoup plus. Le pays est le premier fournisseur africain de pétrole de la Chine et pour Pékin, il s'agit d'y "sécuriser" la continuité de ses approvisionnements pétroliers. Pour cela, tous les moyens sont bons, selon les diplomates américains, qui voient avec effarement qu'en 2004, par exemple, la Chine "a promis de financer le percement de près de 600 puits" au Nigeria, tandis que les Etats-Unis, de leur côté, n'en "finançaient que 50". Et l'auteur du télégramme de relever qu'à une réception à l'ambassade de Chine, un ministre Nigerian a qualifié le pays de ses hôtes de "plus important partenaire de l'Afrique".
"L'ANGOLA S'EST TOURNÉ VERS LES CHINOIS"
De même, les diplomates américains scrutent les activités de la Chine en Angola, riche de ses ressources pétrolières et minières. L'Angola est le premier pays d'Afrique où Pékin a mis en œuvre une formule associant des déboursements de gros montants (plusieurs milliards de dollars) à des travaux de très grande ampleur dans les infrastructures et des remboursements garantis par des livraisons de matières premières. Un télégramme décrit comment, après la fin de la guerre civile qui avait dévasté le pays jusqu'en 2002, "en l'absence d'une conférence internationale de bailleurs de fonds occidentaux pour l'aider à financer sa reconstruction, l'Angola s'est tourné vers les Chinois".
Le vice-président chinois, Xi Jinping, et le président angolais, José Eduardo dos Santos, à Luanda, le 19 novembre 2010.AFP/FRANCISCO BERNARDO
Le financement chinois s'est matérialisé par une ligne de crédit de 4 milliards de dollars auprès de la Eximbank chinoise, garantie sur du pétrole. Ce n'est qu'une première étape. Des "rapports non confirmés font état d'une ligne de crédit supplémentaire de 4 à 6 milliards de dollars", s'inquiète l'auteur d'un télégramme, qui relève cependant quelques difficultés : ce second afflux de milliards doit être financé par un fonds d'investissement basé à Hongkong, le China Investment Fund (CIF), une structure opaque. Dans un premier temps, l'ambassade "doute que [ce projet] attire suffisamment d'investisseurs chinois dans le secteur des infrastructures".
L'ANGOLA NE PEUT PLUS PAYER LES TRAVAILLEURS CHINOIS
Peu à peu se dessine une série de ratés dans la machine des financements de Pékin. "Le rythme endiablé des engagements chinois en Angola s'est considérablement ralenti en 2009 quand la crise financière globale a taillé dans les revenus du pétrole et des diamants angolais, entraînant des réductions des dépenses du gouvernement angolais. Selon l'ambassadeur chinois à Luanda, la Chine a été obligée de rapatrier plus de 25 000 travailleurs (…) faute d'argent du gouvernement angolais pour les payer."
Est-ce en raison de ces difficultés que les relations entre diplomates chinois et américains à Luanda semblent s'améliorer au fil du temps ? En 2008, les deux ambassadeurs essayaient d'identifier des projets communs, bien qu'un peu limités, dans leurs efforts pour communiquer, par le fait que le Chinois, regrette son homologue, "ne parle ni portugais, ni anglais, et juste un peu d'espagnol". Au passage, le diplomate américain essaie de glaner des informations sur le CIF, mais échoue. Son interlocuteur s'évertue à s'en dissocier…
L'année suivante, les relations diplomatiques sino-américaines en Angola continuent de se réchauffer. En janvier, un haut responsable de l'ambassade chinoise "tient une longue série de discussions très ouvertes" avec ses homologues, lesquels qualifieront la conversation de "très étonnante en raison de la densité de son contenu et de sa tonalité constructive, dans un esprit de collaboration".
Etonnante en effet puisque le diplomate chinois y fait part de ses doutes au sujet d'une nouvelle tranche de financements chinois. Le "nombre à un chiffre de milliards [de dollars]" susceptible d'être déboursé ne sera plus garanti sur des livraisons de pétrole, mais nécessitera un engagement direct du gouvernement local. Continuer à garantir des prêts sur des livraisons de brut "serait trop humiliant pour l'Angola", estime-t-il.
"DOUZE MILLIARDS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES"
Lors d'une visite récente en Chine, le président angolais, Eduardo Dos Santos, a fait part des besoins courants de son pays en matière de financements chinois : "douze milliards supplémentaires". Or, les engagements contractés en 2003 entre les deux pays limitaient les financements chinois à dix milliards. Quatre milliards et demi ont déjà été engagés. Et le diplomate chinois de se plaindre des modes de fonctionnement de la CIF, proche du gouvernement local, mais bien que disposant "d'une large présence en Angola, sa mauvaise gestion et les faiblesses de sa direction ont paralysé de nombreux projets".
Le diplomate chinois conclut alors que son pays ne pourra faire face aux "besoins de l'Angola". "[Il] exprime sa préoccupation de voir les responsables du gouvernement angolais ne pas prendre la mesure de la crise économique globale et son impact sur la capacité de la Chine à lever des fonds privés pour des projets en Angola."
Au final, pourquoi la Chine et les Etats-Unis ne s'associeraient pas dans des projets de coopération en Angola ? On envisage de chercher des pistes dans le secteur de l'agriculture ou celui de la santé. "Il est important que les Angolais et d'autres observateurs de l'Afrique puissent voir comment nos deux pays peuvent coopérer dans le cadre d'une vision pour un Angola meilleur", conclut diplomatiquement l'auteur du télégramme américain.
Jean-Philippe Rémy
MAS OS CHINESES PASSAM BEM SEM OS SOCIALISTAS.QUE SE LIMITAM A ANDAR A APANHAR AS CANAS DOS FOGUETES CHINESES...
A MALTA SEM SER A PAGAR E A SUBORNAR NÃO CONSEGUE MESMO NADA.QUER-SE DIZER CONSEGUIR CONSEGUE MAS É NA PARTE DA DESPESA , DAS "NACIONALIZAÇÕES", DA "COOPERAÇÃO", DAS AJUDAS, DOS "PERDÕES DE DÍVIDA".COM O QUE ALGUNS SE SAFAM...
pour Le Monde.fr | 08.12.10 | 22h30
Le président chinois, Hu Jintao, à Nairobi le 28 avril 2006.AFP/SIMON MAINA
En Afrique, les Etats-Unis regardent de près les faits et gestes de le Chine. Au cours des cinq dernières années, Washington a pris conscience que l'envergure de la politique africaine du gouvernement chinois, destinée notamment à garantir l'accès aux ressources du continent noir, est devenue une menace pour ses propres intérêts. Rien d'étonnant que les diplomates suivent avec attention certains dossiers liés à la présence chinoise en Afrique, et tentent de voir plus clair dans la politique de Pékin, même lorsqu'il s'agit d'une affaire de corruption.
Le Kenya en fournit un exemple. Dans un document obtenu par WikiLeaks et analysé par Le Monde, l'ambassade amércaine à Nairobi décortique un cas de pot-de-vin versé dans le cadre d'une attribution de marché de la compagnie de téléphone Telkom Kenya à une entreprise chinoise, Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Company (ZTE) – dont les produits envahissent l'Afrique – dans le cadre d'un marché d'équipement des services de renseignement, le NSIS.
Pour les diplomates, l'attribution du marché repose sur un "pot-de-vin ", qui a "conduit Telkom à attribuer ce marché [à ZTE] après y avoir été contrainte" par le directeur général du NSIS, Michael Gichangi, et le directeur de la division des opérations, Joseph Kamau. "La préférence de Gichangi pour ZTE est basée sur une commission reçue au cours d'un voyage en Chine. Kamau a reçu des paiements mensuels de 5 000 dollars de ZTE, utilisés pour payer des factures médicales."
"DES CONTREBANDIERS D'IVOIRES CHINOIS"
Ce cas de corruption somme toute modeste est-il fondé sur une enquête serrée ? Le télégramme ne le dit pas, son auteur préférant passer à d'autres aspects de la présence chinoise, notamment le fait que le pays est "submergé" par de la "contrefaçon chinoise" qui concurrence des produits américains, telles que "les batteries", tandis que des masses de travailleurs chinois arrivent au Kenya et menacent l'emploi dans le pays.
A Nairobi, "90% des contrebandiers d'ivoire sont chinois", selon l'organisme kenyan chargé des parcs et de la faune sauvage, le KWSAFP/DOUANES FRANCAISES
Le même télégramme fait état d'une conversation avec un responsable de l'organisme kenyan chargé des parcs et de la faune sauvage, le KWS. Celui-ci dit avoir noté "une hausse sensible des activités de braconnage à proximité des camps où sont installés les travailleurs chinois". Il cite un rapport du KWS qui avance que "90% des contrebandiers d'ivoires détenus à l'aéroport [de Nairobi] sont des Chinois."
Au Nigeria, les ambitions de la Chine intéressent et inquiètent beaucoup plus. Le pays est le premier fournisseur africain de pétrole de la Chine et pour Pékin, il s'agit d'y "sécuriser" la continuité de ses approvisionnements pétroliers. Pour cela, tous les moyens sont bons, selon les diplomates américains, qui voient avec effarement qu'en 2004, par exemple, la Chine "a promis de financer le percement de près de 600 puits" au Nigeria, tandis que les Etats-Unis, de leur côté, n'en "finançaient que 50". Et l'auteur du télégramme de relever qu'à une réception à l'ambassade de Chine, un ministre Nigerian a qualifié le pays de ses hôtes de "plus important partenaire de l'Afrique".
"L'ANGOLA S'EST TOURNÉ VERS LES CHINOIS"
De même, les diplomates américains scrutent les activités de la Chine en Angola, riche de ses ressources pétrolières et minières. L'Angola est le premier pays d'Afrique où Pékin a mis en œuvre une formule associant des déboursements de gros montants (plusieurs milliards de dollars) à des travaux de très grande ampleur dans les infrastructures et des remboursements garantis par des livraisons de matières premières. Un télégramme décrit comment, après la fin de la guerre civile qui avait dévasté le pays jusqu'en 2002, "en l'absence d'une conférence internationale de bailleurs de fonds occidentaux pour l'aider à financer sa reconstruction, l'Angola s'est tourné vers les Chinois".
Le vice-président chinois, Xi Jinping, et le président angolais, José Eduardo dos Santos, à Luanda, le 19 novembre 2010.AFP/FRANCISCO BERNARDO
Le financement chinois s'est matérialisé par une ligne de crédit de 4 milliards de dollars auprès de la Eximbank chinoise, garantie sur du pétrole. Ce n'est qu'une première étape. Des "rapports non confirmés font état d'une ligne de crédit supplémentaire de 4 à 6 milliards de dollars", s'inquiète l'auteur d'un télégramme, qui relève cependant quelques difficultés : ce second afflux de milliards doit être financé par un fonds d'investissement basé à Hongkong, le China Investment Fund (CIF), une structure opaque. Dans un premier temps, l'ambassade "doute que [ce projet] attire suffisamment d'investisseurs chinois dans le secteur des infrastructures".
L'ANGOLA NE PEUT PLUS PAYER LES TRAVAILLEURS CHINOIS
Peu à peu se dessine une série de ratés dans la machine des financements de Pékin. "Le rythme endiablé des engagements chinois en Angola s'est considérablement ralenti en 2009 quand la crise financière globale a taillé dans les revenus du pétrole et des diamants angolais, entraînant des réductions des dépenses du gouvernement angolais. Selon l'ambassadeur chinois à Luanda, la Chine a été obligée de rapatrier plus de 25 000 travailleurs (…) faute d'argent du gouvernement angolais pour les payer."
Est-ce en raison de ces difficultés que les relations entre diplomates chinois et américains à Luanda semblent s'améliorer au fil du temps ? En 2008, les deux ambassadeurs essayaient d'identifier des projets communs, bien qu'un peu limités, dans leurs efforts pour communiquer, par le fait que le Chinois, regrette son homologue, "ne parle ni portugais, ni anglais, et juste un peu d'espagnol". Au passage, le diplomate américain essaie de glaner des informations sur le CIF, mais échoue. Son interlocuteur s'évertue à s'en dissocier…
L'année suivante, les relations diplomatiques sino-américaines en Angola continuent de se réchauffer. En janvier, un haut responsable de l'ambassade chinoise "tient une longue série de discussions très ouvertes" avec ses homologues, lesquels qualifieront la conversation de "très étonnante en raison de la densité de son contenu et de sa tonalité constructive, dans un esprit de collaboration".
Etonnante en effet puisque le diplomate chinois y fait part de ses doutes au sujet d'une nouvelle tranche de financements chinois. Le "nombre à un chiffre de milliards [de dollars]" susceptible d'être déboursé ne sera plus garanti sur des livraisons de pétrole, mais nécessitera un engagement direct du gouvernement local. Continuer à garantir des prêts sur des livraisons de brut "serait trop humiliant pour l'Angola", estime-t-il.
"DOUZE MILLIARDS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES"
Lors d'une visite récente en Chine, le président angolais, Eduardo Dos Santos, a fait part des besoins courants de son pays en matière de financements chinois : "douze milliards supplémentaires". Or, les engagements contractés en 2003 entre les deux pays limitaient les financements chinois à dix milliards. Quatre milliards et demi ont déjà été engagés. Et le diplomate chinois de se plaindre des modes de fonctionnement de la CIF, proche du gouvernement local, mais bien que disposant "d'une large présence en Angola, sa mauvaise gestion et les faiblesses de sa direction ont paralysé de nombreux projets".
Le diplomate chinois conclut alors que son pays ne pourra faire face aux "besoins de l'Angola". "[Il] exprime sa préoccupation de voir les responsables du gouvernement angolais ne pas prendre la mesure de la crise économique globale et son impact sur la capacité de la Chine à lever des fonds privés pour des projets en Angola."
Au final, pourquoi la Chine et les Etats-Unis ne s'associeraient pas dans des projets de coopération en Angola ? On envisage de chercher des pistes dans le secteur de l'agriculture ou celui de la santé. "Il est important que les Angolais et d'autres observateurs de l'Afrique puissent voir comment nos deux pays peuvent coopérer dans le cadre d'une vision pour un Angola meilleur", conclut diplomatiquement l'auteur du télégramme américain.
Jean-Philippe Rémy
MAS OS CHINESES PASSAM BEM SEM OS SOCIALISTAS.QUE SE LIMITAM A ANDAR A APANHAR AS CANAS DOS FOGUETES CHINESES...
A MALTA SEM SER A PAGAR E A SUBORNAR NÃO CONSEGUE MESMO NADA.QUER-SE DIZER CONSEGUIR CONSEGUE MAS É NA PARTE DA DESPESA , DAS "NACIONALIZAÇÕES", DA "COOPERAÇÃO", DAS AJUDAS, DOS "PERDÕES DE DÍVIDA".COM O QUE ALGUNS SE SAFAM...
DÃO DE BORLA CABORA BASSA E AINDA PAGAM SUBORNOS AO GUEBUZA...
VZCZCXRO0006
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHTO #0086/01 0280621
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 280621Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1221
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0605
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000086
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KMCA MCC SNAR EINV MZ
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX TALKS OF CORRUPTION AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
REF: A. MAPUTO 80
¶B. 07 MAPUTO 1395
MAPUTO 00000086 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd Chapman for reasons 1.4 (b+d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Charge recently met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
--("the source") who described his frustrations with FRELIMO, President
Guebuza, and Mohamed Bashir Suleiman (MBS). He complained that
they exercise complete control over the licit and illicit economy of
Mozambique. The source, who has excellent connections within
the Government of Mozambique (GRM), including the private number
of the President, as well as a personal relationship with MBS,
said "I do not want to do business anymore in Mozambique
“ because of this triumverate of control. He is liquidating his
assets and leaving Mozambique, and says that he now sees
the "malaise" in Mozambique as if "he had cataracts
but now see it all."
¶2. (S/NF) The source describes President Guebuza, who he
has known and befriended for the past twenty years as a
"vicious scorpion who will sting you," and has an even more
grav assessment of MBS. He cautions that FRELIMO is not
interested in bettering the life of Mozambique's citizens,
but rather its self-enrichment. In the licit economy, the
ruling party, FRELIMO, and MBS work in tandem to control the
legal and illegal economies and restrict the space for
private sector growth by demanding a cut of all significant
business transactions. In the illicit economy, MBS dominates
money laundering and drug transshipment, providing kickbacks
to FRELIMO. Other key players involved in pressuring the
business community for bribes or percentage stakes, according
to the source, are Domingos Tivane, head of Customs, and
former Prime Minister Luisa Diogo. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------
MOHAMED BASHIR SULEIMAN AND GUEBUZA
-----------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) The source XXXXXXXXXXXX. He speculated that
over the next term Guebuza would use his business proxies
to amass a still larger personal fortune. Guebuza manages his
business interests through several front companies, including
Celso Ismael Correia's Insitec and Salimo Abdullah's Intelec
Holdings. The source said that MBS meets directly with
President Guebuza, who has direct knowledge of MBS' funding
to both the FRELIMO party (underwriting the recent election
campaign) and Guebuza's front companies. The source, who
described Correia as a "30 year-old pipsqueak," stated that
Correia has no business experience or university degree, but
shows great loyalty to Guebuza.
¶4. (C) Guebuza's business interests in Mozambique are
legion. They include stakes in Mocambique Gestores (MG),
Maputo Port Development Company (MPDC) which runs Maputo
Port, Focus 21, Navique, Vodacom, and SASOL. Guebuza also
has a share in Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI)
which controls the toll road from Maputo to South Africa,
according to the source. Guebuza has shares in a significant
number of banks, including BCI Fomento (where Correia is
Chairman), Mocambique Capitais, Moza Banco, and Geocapital.
Through family members, Guebuza also controls Intelec
Business Advisory and Consulting, Beira Grain Terminal, MBT
Construction Ltd, Englob Consultants Ltd, Mozambique Power
Industries, Macequece Ltd, and Mozambique Natural Resources
Corp.
¶5. (S/NF) One new area that Guebuza appears to be
interested in is the gaming industry. The source says that
Guebuza forced the Constitutional Council (CC) to review and
declare a recent law liberalizing the gaming industry as
"constitutional" even though it calls for all casino assets
to revert to the state after a defined period of time, in
direct contravention of private property laws enshrined in
the Constitution. The judges of the CC, who also ruled in
favor of decisions during the elections to invalidate large
numbers of opposition candidates in the legislative and
presidential races, complained of the unconstitutionality of
the new law, but were told to give it a favorable ruling,
which they did.
¶6. (S/NF) The source elaborated on the depth of Guebuza's
business interests, which range across the economy. He said
MAPUTO 00000086 002.2 OF 003
that Guebuza is in on almost all of the "mega-project"
multi-million dollar deals via contractual stipulations to
work with the Mozambican private sector. One example is
Guebuza's involvement in the 2007 purchase of Cahora Bassa
Hydroelectric Dam (HCB) from the Portuguese Government for
$950 million. $700 million of this was paid by a private
consortium of banks, which was arranged by a Guebuza proxy,
for which Guebuza received, while he was a sitting president,
an estimated commission of between $35 and $50 million. The
Portuguese bank which arranged the financing turned over its
shares in BCI Fomento, one of the largest Mozambican
commercial banks, to a Guebuza-controlled company.
---------------
MBS AND FRELIMO
---------------
¶7. (S/NF) The source, says that FRELIMO brazenly squeezes
the business community for kickbacks. As an example, the
source said that he has personally seen Manuel Tome, former
FRELIMO Secretary General, senior member of the National
Assembly, and relative of President Chissano, in MBS' office
receiving pay-offs quite openly. Head of Customs Domingos
Tivane openly demands and receives payoffs from importers,
including MBS. The source stated that one business contact
remarked to him that when visiting Tivane's expansive home to
deliver a bribe he noticed that the bureaucrat had solid gold
fixtures in his bathroom. The source also stated that former
Prime Minister Luisa Diogo, until she was removed from the
Cabinet (septel), was heavily involved in taking bribes for
FRELIMO, of which she kept a percentage. Similar allegations
were raised in the 21 January issue of Zambeze, regarding
soft loans paid to Diogo's husband Albano Silva, purchases of
houses and buildings for a fraction of their value, as well
as Diogo's close ties to officials such as Diodino Cambaza,
whose corruption trial is ongoing.
¶8. (S/NF) At the ports, the source commented that FRELIMO
has its own clearing agent that handles FRELIMO and MBS
business. The clearing agent chronically under-invoices
items, avoids the 17% VAT, and also has an arrangement with
Tivane's Customs authorities to bypass the ports' mandatory
scanning. The source has documentary proof of the
under-invoicing by MBS, and poloff has seen MBS' trucks drive
through the port without being scanned. Nonetheless, the
source said that Government of Mozambique (GRM) officials
routinely describe MBS as an "untouchable" due to his
connections to Tivane and Guebuza, a situation which is
reported to irk a cash-strapped Tax Authority (AT) President
Rosario Fernandes.
-------------------------
MBS AND OTHER BUSINESSMEN
-------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Regarding MBS' retail operation, the source
states that MBS does not tolerate competition. The source's
milk processing facility was threatened by MBS who used
VAT-avoidance and under-invoicing to dump vast quantities of
imported condensed milk on the market in order to put the
source out of business. Only after the source made an
agreement with MBS for exclusive distribution of his milk
products, with a 10% kickback on all sales to MBS, did MBS
stop his dumping practices. Other businessmen have
complained about similar practices in other commodities to
include edible oil. The source complained that "even those
who bribe" MBS or FRELIMO cannot make a profit under such
conditions.
------------------------------
NARCOTICS AND MONEY LAUNDERING
------------------------------
¶10. (S/NF) The source says he only has second hand
knowledge of drug trafficking and money laundering in
Mozambique. He said that "MBS and the 'Nacala dealers' all
have offices in Dubai" to facilitate money laundering
operations in Mozambique. It is through these operations
that after 15 years in business in Mozambique, MBS was able
to pay $30 million in cash to establish his shopping plaza
downtown, Maputo Shopping, which opened in 2007. The source
said that he asked prominent Ismaili/Aga Khan businessman
Mustaque Ali how MBS became so rich so fast, and Ali's wry
answer was "Johnson's baby powder," a euphemism for drugs.
The source noted that the sometimes erratic changes in
MAPUTO 00000086 003.2 OF 003
Mozambique's foreign exchange position are due to sudden
multi-million dollar transfers of cash overseas tied to money
laundering. The source commented that in the past few years
there have been several embarrassing situations in which
shiploads of drugs, primarily hashish and heroin have washed
ashore; however, the media is usually afraid to report on
such incidents because no one wants to become another Carlos
Cardoso, the courageous Mozambican journalist who was
murdered in 2000 while investigating a massive bank fraud
tied to then-President Chissano's family.
---------------------------------------------
COMMENT: CANDID COMMENTS FROM A CONNECTED MAN
---------------------------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) The source, XXXXXXXXXXXX While he has an axe to
grind because he is frustrated with the scope and depth of
corruption in Mozambique, his statements corroborate what we
have learned from other sources (Ref A). Ties with MBS and
other known money launders and narcotraffickers by senior GRM
officials are disturbing and demonstrate a short-sighted
focus on self-enrichment. The source cautions against
building long term relationships with FRELIMO, and fears
that, having allowed the illicit economy to prosper, and
having advertised Mozambique as a money laundering
destination and drug transshipment hotspot, the ruling party
will no longer be able to control the nefarious activities
within its borders. Rumors and stories of corruption abound
in Mozambique, but rarely will a successful well-connected
XXXXXXXXXXXX be willing to share specific practices based
on first-hand knowledge and participation in these practices.
CHAPMAN
MOÇAMBIQUE AINDA VAI VOLTAR A SER DO ALMEIDA SANTOS...
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHTO #0086/01 0280621
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 280621Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1221
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0605
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000086
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KMCA MCC SNAR EINV MZ
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX TALKS OF CORRUPTION AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
REF: A. MAPUTO 80
¶B. 07 MAPUTO 1395
MAPUTO 00000086 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd Chapman for reasons 1.4 (b+d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Charge recently met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
--("the source") who described his frustrations with FRELIMO, President
Guebuza, and Mohamed Bashir Suleiman (MBS). He complained that
they exercise complete control over the licit and illicit economy of
Mozambique. The source, who has excellent connections within
the Government of Mozambique (GRM), including the private number
of the President, as well as a personal relationship with MBS,
said "I do not want to do business anymore in Mozambique
“ because of this triumverate of control. He is liquidating his
assets and leaving Mozambique, and says that he now sees
the "malaise" in Mozambique as if "he had cataracts
but now see it all."
¶2. (S/NF) The source describes President Guebuza, who he
has known and befriended for the past twenty years as a
"vicious scorpion who will sting you," and has an even more
grav assessment of MBS. He cautions that FRELIMO is not
interested in bettering the life of Mozambique's citizens,
but rather its self-enrichment. In the licit economy, the
ruling party, FRELIMO, and MBS work in tandem to control the
legal and illegal economies and restrict the space for
private sector growth by demanding a cut of all significant
business transactions. In the illicit economy, MBS dominates
money laundering and drug transshipment, providing kickbacks
to FRELIMO. Other key players involved in pressuring the
business community for bribes or percentage stakes, according
to the source, are Domingos Tivane, head of Customs, and
former Prime Minister Luisa Diogo. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------
MOHAMED BASHIR SULEIMAN AND GUEBUZA
-----------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) The source XXXXXXXXXXXX. He speculated that
over the next term Guebuza would use his business proxies
to amass a still larger personal fortune. Guebuza manages his
business interests through several front companies, including
Celso Ismael Correia's Insitec and Salimo Abdullah's Intelec
Holdings. The source said that MBS meets directly with
President Guebuza, who has direct knowledge of MBS' funding
to both the FRELIMO party (underwriting the recent election
campaign) and Guebuza's front companies. The source, who
described Correia as a "30 year-old pipsqueak," stated that
Correia has no business experience or university degree, but
shows great loyalty to Guebuza.
¶4. (C) Guebuza's business interests in Mozambique are
legion. They include stakes in Mocambique Gestores (MG),
Maputo Port Development Company (MPDC) which runs Maputo
Port, Focus 21, Navique, Vodacom, and SASOL. Guebuza also
has a share in Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI)
which controls the toll road from Maputo to South Africa,
according to the source. Guebuza has shares in a significant
number of banks, including BCI Fomento (where Correia is
Chairman), Mocambique Capitais, Moza Banco, and Geocapital.
Through family members, Guebuza also controls Intelec
Business Advisory and Consulting, Beira Grain Terminal, MBT
Construction Ltd, Englob Consultants Ltd, Mozambique Power
Industries, Macequece Ltd, and Mozambique Natural Resources
Corp.
¶5. (S/NF) One new area that Guebuza appears to be
interested in is the gaming industry. The source says that
Guebuza forced the Constitutional Council (CC) to review and
declare a recent law liberalizing the gaming industry as
"constitutional" even though it calls for all casino assets
to revert to the state after a defined period of time, in
direct contravention of private property laws enshrined in
the Constitution. The judges of the CC, who also ruled in
favor of decisions during the elections to invalidate large
numbers of opposition candidates in the legislative and
presidential races, complained of the unconstitutionality of
the new law, but were told to give it a favorable ruling,
which they did.
¶6. (S/NF) The source elaborated on the depth of Guebuza's
business interests, which range across the economy. He said
MAPUTO 00000086 002.2 OF 003
that Guebuza is in on almost all of the "mega-project"
multi-million dollar deals via contractual stipulations to
work with the Mozambican private sector. One example is
Guebuza's involvement in the 2007 purchase of Cahora Bassa
Hydroelectric Dam (HCB) from the Portuguese Government for
$950 million. $700 million of this was paid by a private
consortium of banks, which was arranged by a Guebuza proxy,
for which Guebuza received, while he was a sitting president,
an estimated commission of between $35 and $50 million. The
Portuguese bank which arranged the financing turned over its
shares in BCI Fomento, one of the largest Mozambican
commercial banks, to a Guebuza-controlled company.
---------------
MBS AND FRELIMO
---------------
¶7. (S/NF) The source, says that FRELIMO brazenly squeezes
the business community for kickbacks. As an example, the
source said that he has personally seen Manuel Tome, former
FRELIMO Secretary General, senior member of the National
Assembly, and relative of President Chissano, in MBS' office
receiving pay-offs quite openly. Head of Customs Domingos
Tivane openly demands and receives payoffs from importers,
including MBS. The source stated that one business contact
remarked to him that when visiting Tivane's expansive home to
deliver a bribe he noticed that the bureaucrat had solid gold
fixtures in his bathroom. The source also stated that former
Prime Minister Luisa Diogo, until she was removed from the
Cabinet (septel), was heavily involved in taking bribes for
FRELIMO, of which she kept a percentage. Similar allegations
were raised in the 21 January issue of Zambeze, regarding
soft loans paid to Diogo's husband Albano Silva, purchases of
houses and buildings for a fraction of their value, as well
as Diogo's close ties to officials such as Diodino Cambaza,
whose corruption trial is ongoing.
¶8. (S/NF) At the ports, the source commented that FRELIMO
has its own clearing agent that handles FRELIMO and MBS
business. The clearing agent chronically under-invoices
items, avoids the 17% VAT, and also has an arrangement with
Tivane's Customs authorities to bypass the ports' mandatory
scanning. The source has documentary proof of the
under-invoicing by MBS, and poloff has seen MBS' trucks drive
through the port without being scanned. Nonetheless, the
source said that Government of Mozambique (GRM) officials
routinely describe MBS as an "untouchable" due to his
connections to Tivane and Guebuza, a situation which is
reported to irk a cash-strapped Tax Authority (AT) President
Rosario Fernandes.
-------------------------
MBS AND OTHER BUSINESSMEN
-------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Regarding MBS' retail operation, the source
states that MBS does not tolerate competition. The source's
milk processing facility was threatened by MBS who used
VAT-avoidance and under-invoicing to dump vast quantities of
imported condensed milk on the market in order to put the
source out of business. Only after the source made an
agreement with MBS for exclusive distribution of his milk
products, with a 10% kickback on all sales to MBS, did MBS
stop his dumping practices. Other businessmen have
complained about similar practices in other commodities to
include edible oil. The source complained that "even those
who bribe" MBS or FRELIMO cannot make a profit under such
conditions.
------------------------------
NARCOTICS AND MONEY LAUNDERING
------------------------------
¶10. (S/NF) The source says he only has second hand
knowledge of drug trafficking and money laundering in
Mozambique. He said that "MBS and the 'Nacala dealers' all
have offices in Dubai" to facilitate money laundering
operations in Mozambique. It is through these operations
that after 15 years in business in Mozambique, MBS was able
to pay $30 million in cash to establish his shopping plaza
downtown, Maputo Shopping, which opened in 2007. The source
said that he asked prominent Ismaili/Aga Khan businessman
Mustaque Ali how MBS became so rich so fast, and Ali's wry
answer was "Johnson's baby powder," a euphemism for drugs.
The source noted that the sometimes erratic changes in
MAPUTO 00000086 003.2 OF 003
Mozambique's foreign exchange position are due to sudden
multi-million dollar transfers of cash overseas tied to money
laundering. The source commented that in the past few years
there have been several embarrassing situations in which
shiploads of drugs, primarily hashish and heroin have washed
ashore; however, the media is usually afraid to report on
such incidents because no one wants to become another Carlos
Cardoso, the courageous Mozambican journalist who was
murdered in 2000 while investigating a massive bank fraud
tied to then-President Chissano's family.
---------------------------------------------
COMMENT: CANDID COMMENTS FROM A CONNECTED MAN
---------------------------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) The source, XXXXXXXXXXXX While he has an axe to
grind because he is frustrated with the scope and depth of
corruption in Mozambique, his statements corroborate what we
have learned from other sources (Ref A). Ties with MBS and
other known money launders and narcotraffickers by senior GRM
officials are disturbing and demonstrate a short-sighted
focus on self-enrichment. The source cautions against
building long term relationships with FRELIMO, and fears
that, having allowed the illicit economy to prosper, and
having advertised Mozambique as a money laundering
destination and drug transshipment hotspot, the ruling party
will no longer be able to control the nefarious activities
within its borders. Rumors and stories of corruption abound
in Mozambique, but rarely will a successful well-connected
XXXXXXXXXXXX be willing to share specific practices based
on first-hand knowledge and participation in these practices.
CHAPMAN
MOÇAMBIQUE AINDA VAI VOLTAR A SER DO ALMEIDA SANTOS...
5 QUADRILHAS LEGALIZADAS E COBERTAS PELA SUA LEI
O direito penal é uma aldrabice
Sol:
O empresário Manuel José Godinho, principal arguido no caso Face Oculta, pediu a abertura da instrução e requereu a nulidade das escutas e da prisão preventiva, alegando haver incompetência territorial dos juízes que intervieram no processo, disse hoje fonte judicial.
O pedido consta do requerimento de abertura da instrução enviado ao Tribunal de Instrução Criminal de Aveiro, como confirmou à agência Lusa Artur Marques, advogado do empresário do ramo das sucatas que se encontra preso preventivamente há mais de um ano.
Na opinião do causídico, o juiz de Instrução Criminal de Ovar, o primeiro que participou neste processo, e o juiz de Instrução de Aveiro «não são competentes para a prática de actos jurisdicionais no âmbito deste inquérito», devido à dispersão territorial da alegada actividade criminosa.
Artur Marques argumenta que, quando existem crimes praticados em comarcas pertencentes a vários distritos judiciais, como parece ser a situação no caso Face Oculta, «o único juiz competente é o do Tribunal Central de Instrução Criminal (TCIC)», com sede em Lisboa.
É fácil de entender como se sapa um processo penal e se contribui para o sentimento geral de injustiça e de impunidade vigente: arranja-se um argumento jurídico com possibilidades de vingar e está feito.
O facto de em 2007 os revisores do processo penal cominarem quase todas as ilegalidades processuais com o vício da nulidade, é apenas o corolário essencial do estratagema legal.
Quem são os responsáveis directos por este panorama, além dos legisladores?
Alguns teóricos do direito penal que temos. A minha única dúvida é saber se o fazem em nome de princípios em que verdadeiramente acreditam ou se o fazem por interesses inconfessáveis, mormente de natureza patrimonial. Partindo do princípio que não são tão venais quanto isso, a conclusão é que o fazem em nome de princípios em que acreditam.
E se discutissem publicamente esses princípios, para se ver se têm razão?
-------------
Face Oculta. Processo em Lisboa, Godinho em liberdade?
por André Rito, Publicado em 09 de Dezembro de 2010 |
.Advogado de Manuel Godinho pede nulidade dos despachos do Tribunal de Aveiro, que conduziram à prisão preventiva
Sol:
O empresário Manuel José Godinho, principal arguido no caso Face Oculta, pediu a abertura da instrução e requereu a nulidade das escutas e da prisão preventiva, alegando haver incompetência territorial dos juízes que intervieram no processo, disse hoje fonte judicial.
O pedido consta do requerimento de abertura da instrução enviado ao Tribunal de Instrução Criminal de Aveiro, como confirmou à agência Lusa Artur Marques, advogado do empresário do ramo das sucatas que se encontra preso preventivamente há mais de um ano.
Na opinião do causídico, o juiz de Instrução Criminal de Ovar, o primeiro que participou neste processo, e o juiz de Instrução de Aveiro «não são competentes para a prática de actos jurisdicionais no âmbito deste inquérito», devido à dispersão territorial da alegada actividade criminosa.
Artur Marques argumenta que, quando existem crimes praticados em comarcas pertencentes a vários distritos judiciais, como parece ser a situação no caso Face Oculta, «o único juiz competente é o do Tribunal Central de Instrução Criminal (TCIC)», com sede em Lisboa.
É fácil de entender como se sapa um processo penal e se contribui para o sentimento geral de injustiça e de impunidade vigente: arranja-se um argumento jurídico com possibilidades de vingar e está feito.
O facto de em 2007 os revisores do processo penal cominarem quase todas as ilegalidades processuais com o vício da nulidade, é apenas o corolário essencial do estratagema legal.
Quem são os responsáveis directos por este panorama, além dos legisladores?
Alguns teóricos do direito penal que temos. A minha única dúvida é saber se o fazem em nome de princípios em que verdadeiramente acreditam ou se o fazem por interesses inconfessáveis, mormente de natureza patrimonial. Partindo do princípio que não são tão venais quanto isso, a conclusão é que o fazem em nome de princípios em que acreditam.
E se discutissem publicamente esses princípios, para se ver se têm razão?
-------------
Face Oculta. Processo em Lisboa, Godinho em liberdade?
por André Rito, Publicado em 09 de Dezembro de 2010 |
.Advogado de Manuel Godinho pede nulidade dos despachos do Tribunal de Aveiro, que conduziram à prisão preventiva
OS OURIVES TÊM QUE PRATICAR O TIRO.PARA ACERTAR...
Ourives recebeu ladrões com tiros
00h15m
I.S. e N.S.
Quatro encapuzados, com duas caçadeiras, tentaram assaltar, ontem à tarde, a Ourivesaria Lebre, na Avenida D. João I, em RioTinto, Gondomar, mas foram recebidos a tiro pelo dono do estabelecimento comercial.
É QUE A "JUSTIÇA" ESTÁ AO LADO DOS CRIMINOSOS.E CADA UM TEM QUE DEFENDER O QUE É SEU...
00h15m
I.S. e N.S.
Quatro encapuzados, com duas caçadeiras, tentaram assaltar, ontem à tarde, a Ourivesaria Lebre, na Avenida D. João I, em RioTinto, Gondomar, mas foram recebidos a tiro pelo dono do estabelecimento comercial.
É QUE A "JUSTIÇA" ESTÁ AO LADO DOS CRIMINOSOS.E CADA UM TEM QUE DEFENDER O QUE É SEU...
PARA ESTE TODOS SÃO FILHOS DE DEUS E O MUNDO É UM SÓ
Antigo bispo de Setúbal acusa Governo de "matar pela raiz os direitos sociais"
O antigo bispo de Setúbal Manuel Martins está "triste e revoltado" com as situações de "miséria absoluta" existentes em Portugal. Cconsequência de uma "economia diabólica, desgraçada, hiper super liberal".
PORTANTO É APOIANTE DA VELHA MÁXIMA:TEMOS QUE GANHAR MENOS PARA OUTRS GANHAREM MAIS.LEVANDO A COISA Á LETRA TEMOS QUE DIVIDIR COM A ÁFRICA INTEIRA...
O antigo bispo de Setúbal Manuel Martins está "triste e revoltado" com as situações de "miséria absoluta" existentes em Portugal. Cconsequência de uma "economia diabólica, desgraçada, hiper super liberal".
PORTANTO É APOIANTE DA VELHA MÁXIMA:TEMOS QUE GANHAR MENOS PARA OUTRS GANHAREM MAIS.LEVANDO A COISA Á LETRA TEMOS QUE DIVIDIR COM A ÁFRICA INTEIRA...
DOS 50 QUANTOS TÊM PROCESSO DE PEDIDO DE INDEMNIZAÇÃO AO ESTADO?
Só houve 50 condenados a prisão efectiva por corrupção numa década
A DEMOCRACIA É O MELHOR SISTEMA.AGORA O TARRAFAL É NA PARADISÍACA ILHA DO SAL...
A DEMOCRACIA É O MELHOR SISTEMA.AGORA O TARRAFAL É NA PARADISÍACA ILHA DO SAL...
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